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NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA
F ALL the wars Napoleon waged, the War of 1812 was
the most avowedly imperialistic, and was most directly
dictated by the interests of the French financiers and big
capitalists.
For Russia this was a war for the preservation of her economic and political independence; a war to save herself not
only from the ruin threatened 'as a result of Napoleon's
blockade policy, which hindered Russian trade with England,
but also from dismemberment, for the Poles were hoping,with
the aid of the French Emperor to secure Lithuania and Byelorussia, and even to reach the Black Sea. Hence, as far as
Russia was concerned, the War of 1812 was in the fullest sense
a fight for existence; a war of .defense against a predatory imperialist invasion. This accounts for the nationwide character
of the great struggle that the Russian people then waged so
heroically against the world conqueror.
Diplomats began to discuss the possibility of such a war in
the beginning of 1810, but the seeds of it were sown some time
before that.
On December 2, 1805, Napoleon inflicted a severe defeat on
the Austrian and Russian forces at Austerlitz. In this battle
the French could clearly see the difference between the fighting
qualities of the Russian soldiers and those of the less stalwart
and less courageous Austrians. In 1807 the Russian troop,
which the Tsar had sent to save Prussia from utter subjugation, fought against Napoleon's forces first in the sanguinary
but indecisive battle of Eylau on February 8, and then in the
battle of Friedland on June 14, which ended in a victory for
Napoleon. This battle was followed by the conclusion of the
Treaty of Tilsit, by which Alexander I entered into an alliance with' Napoleon and joined the so-called "continental
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blockade." This meant that Russia pledged herself not to
vade with England3 to permit no Englishmen to enter Russia,
an''to declare war on England. Napoleon bad insisted on
these terms in order to bring England to her knees, but their
operation greatly damaged the interests of the Russian landowners and merchants. Russian trade dwindled, and the state
finances of Russia were reduced to low ebb.
Later, however, the situation changed. The annexation of
Holland by France in June, 1810;the transfer of three French
divisions from the south of Germany to the Baltic coast in
.August of that year; and the dispatch from France of fifty
thousand muskets to the Duchy of Warsaw-the Polish state
created by Napoleon and headed by the King of Saxonywere all portentous signs of another approaching storm. Russian diplomats attributed these events to Napoleon's "Austrian
marriage" (with' Marie-Louise, daughter of the Austrian Emperor) zind to his alliance with Austria. Napoleon no longer
nekaed R ~ s i a his
; power in Europe had found a new prop in
Vienna. From that time onward relations between Napoleon
and Alexandei 'I be&e very :strained.
- In 'the beginning of 18i$ ~ & ~ 0 1 esucceeded
0n
in concluding
a military alliance with Prussi'a and . Austria against Russia.
During an abdience granted him by Napoleon on April 27,
Prince KuraBin, Russian ahbassador in Paris, requested that
the French t m p s be withdrawn from Prussia. He also drew
attent'ion to Napoleon's. coldssd armaments and to his "alliance" with Prussia,' whi& wis 06viously leveled 'against
Russia. Napoleon either did not listen and went on talking
about something else, .or' else kept repeating an emphatic
-refusal. Next day Kurakin visited Hugues-Bernard Maret,
Duke of Bassano, the ~rench"~inister
of Foreign Affairs, and
informed him that while Russia was prepared to yield on
most of -thepoints at issue, she stili insisted on the withdrawal
of the Frefich troops from Prussia and on Russia's right. .to
trade with neutral countries. Napoleon was highly incensed at this demand for the withdrawal of the troops from Prussia and called it an insolent

ultimatum,^" which he clutched at as pro06 that not he but
the ~ s a had
r become aggressive.
War seemed imminent. The majority of diplomats in
Europe believed that if war did break out Napoleon would be
many food
victorious; but certain signs w&e visible that
for reflection.
Fint of all there was Spain. ,Napoleon's position there was
very precarious. The country was seething with revolt and he
had to maintain there an army of over zoo,ooo (twice the size
of the army he subsequently had at Borodino) and even that
was in constant need of r~inforcernentsowing to th6 heavy
losses it SUE
ered.
The second circumstance that eased Russia's position was
the sudden change in Sweden's policy.' Bernadotte, one of
Napoleon's marshals, had been elected Heir Apparent to the
Swedish throne; but as soon as Bernadotte appeared in Sweden
he began to seek a rapprochement with Alexander. In this he
was encouraged by a considerable section of the Swedish aristocracy, which was enraged by Napoleon's tyranny in depriving Sweden of what was called Swedish Pomerania by a mere
stroke of the pen. Furthermore, Alexander promised to help
Sweden to acquire Norway.
The third factor that was in Russia's favor was the conclusion of peace -with Turkey. The peace treaty signed by
Marshal Kutuzov in Bucharest on May 22 was rather favorable for Russia, and the cessation of the Russo-Turkish war
released 80,ooo to 40,000 Russian soldiers for service elsewhere if the contingency arose.
Such were the relatively favorable circumstances that gave
grounds for the hope that Russia would be able successfully
to defend herself against her formidable enemy. Nevertheless,
consternation reigned at the Court and among the higher
aristocracy in St. Petersburg.
On May 9, 1812, Napoleon set out for Dresden, ostensibly
for the purpose of reviewing the Grand Army on the Vistula.
It was common knowledge, however, that he was setting out
on a war against Russia.
9
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His triumphant progress through Germany and the endless
columns of troops he passed on the way streaming toward the
East made him feel that he was indeed the dictator of the continent of Europe. The King and Queen of Saxony traveled a
long way out of Dresden 'to meet him. In Dresden the
~ u s t r i a nEmperor
Franz I and his consort arrived to pay
homage to their august son-in-law; and the King of Prussia
asked-for Napoleon's special permission to present himself at
Dresden to do the same. This gathering of vassal monarchs
and the solemnities attending it were nothing more nor less
than an anti-Russian demonstration. Here, too, Napoleon received Count Narbonne, who arrived -post-haste from Vilna to
report to him.
Taking farewell of his crowned vassals, and leaving MarieLouise and the whole Court at Dresden, Napoleon set out to
meet the Grand Army, which was marching in several columns
toward the Niemen River. At dawn on June 21 he arrived in
the village of Vilkovishko, several miles from the Niemen. On
June 22 he ordered the army to advance to the river.
In none of his previous campaigns had Napoleon been so
conscious of the uncertainty of the outcome of his undertaking
as he was in this one. But when he saw these countless ranks
marching in all their splendor to the Niemen, even the unknown seemed to beckon to him. In a confidential conversation he had with Count Narbonne he said:
"We will now march to Moscow, but why not turn from
Moscow to India? Let no one tell Napoleon that India is far
from MOSCOW.
Alexander of Macedonia did not find Greece
very near to India, but that did not deter him. He reached
the Ganges from a place that was no less distant than Moscow
. . . and it is s~~fficientto touch the Ganges with a French
sword to cause the edifice of England's mercantile magnificence to collapse."

Does this mean that the main objects of the war that
Napoleon was now embarking on were Moscow and India?
Oh, no! Publicly, Napoleon stated that the Tsar had com-
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b withdraw
pelled him to go to war by his "ultimatum" (concerning the
of the French troops from Prussia); that the object
of the war was to bring the Tsar to reason and to forestall all
possibility 01his rapprochement with England; that this war
was purely "political," it was being undertaken with a definite
political object, .and as noon as this w a s achieved he would
be ready to mak'e gkd. C a g & g
that he E a q ~ r + rhimdid stat
. e y-d
;ihls p
~ W% pis .it,sUrPr3s~
i.qp&em2W
&e-* G dAmy, -from-thents$shals right -dawn
to the lowest army cook, did not know why it was being led
to Russia?
,
On taking up his quarters in the manor house in Vilkovishko Napoleon, -on June 22, issued a proclamation to the
Grand Army saying: "We shall advance, cross the Niemen and .
lead the troops into her r[Russia's] territory. . . ." This was, in
effect, Napoleon's declaration of war, for he made no other
declaration. On June 23 Napoleon inspected,the bank-of the
river. Three bridges were being buiIt, the last of which .tias
completed by midnight. There was a fourth bridge at Kovno, .
which could also be used far crossing the river.
On the night of June 23, iBia,. Napoleon issued the ~ r d e r
to his army toto'
cross,the ~ i e m e n .The die was cast.
'

THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES, AND THE
RETREAT OF THE
RUSSIAN ARMY
.
.
LEXANDER learned' that - Napoleon had crossed the
Russian frontier late at night on June 24, while at a ball
given in .hishonor in Vilna. Next day 'he instructed Lieuten,
his Minister fot the Interior,: to take a.
ant-General .Balashbv,
written message to ~ a ~ o l e o and
n , also to tell him verbally
that "if he [Napoleon] desirid to enter into negotiations they
could'be opened f'orthwith; but on one essential conditiofithat he withdrawschis army beyond the frontier.".. "His
Majesty pledged his word that he would neither utter nor
listen to a word about -peaceas long as a single .armed '~Cench
man remained in Russia." .
'on Juae soFBdashov had two interviews with Napoleon,
in the course of which the latter said that he had not intended.
to make war on Russia and that, in fact, he had been on the
point of sending his pemnd belongings to. Spain, where he
had intended to go.
"I know;" he said, "that a war between -France and Russia
is no bagatelle either for France or Russia. I have made great
preparations and my forces are three times as large as yours.
I know as well as you, perhaps even better, how many troops
you have. You have 130,000 infantry and 60,ooo to 70,ooo
cavalry. In short, less than 200,000. I have three times that
number.: Then he complained that Alexander had departed
from his Tilsit policy of friendship with him and had thereby
''mimed his reign."
Balashov returned to Alexander and reported his conversation with Napoleon. Alexander had no alternative but to
aotept Napoleon's challenge, and on July 13 he issued a
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prodamation to the army announcing Napoleon's invasion
and the opening of hostilities.
When news was received that Napoleon was advancing
straight from the Niemen to Vilna, and that Murat, King of
Naples, and his cavalry were in the vanguard, the Russian
Command decided to retreat from Vilna to the "fortified
camp" at Drissa. This camp had been built in accordance
with the plans of General Phull, a member of the Tsar's
suite.
General Phull was regarded as a military expert, and at the
beginning of every campaign he drew up very extensive and
detailed plans, which, however, usually ended in smoke. He
began his career in the Prussian army, but he proved a failure
there and entered the Russian service. In-St.Petersburg he acted
as military tutor to Alexander I. The latter believed that he
was a genius and always took his advice. Without consulting
either Barday de Tolly or Prince Bagration, his two foremost
generals, Alexander had ordered the erection of this "fortified
camp" near the village of Drissa, on the Dvina. Situated as it
was between two highroads, Phull imagined that Pt could serve
as a barrier to Napoleon's advance on both St. Petersburg
and Moscow.
When the army, with the Tsar and Barclay de Tolly at its
head, arrived at Drissa, the generals were horrified. "Only a
lunatic or a traitor could have invented the.Drissa camp,"
categorically declared some of the bolder of them in Alexander's presence. The Drissa camp, with its fictitious "fortifications," they said, would not hold out even a couple of days,
and the Russian army would be in danger of being surrounded
and forced'into a shameful capitulation.
In crossing the Niemen, Napoleon believed that the Russian
army immediately in front of him numbered about 200,000
men. He was wrong. .4ctualli, leavini i t - ~ e n e r a~ormasov's
r
southern Army, which was 'facing the Austrian Corps c6mmanded by Schwanexiberg, on the day o f Napoleon's inv$on,.' the-Russian Conhinand had the'folldi\ting' .£&cei at its
-diipcmlr thk First A*?;
command2d by ~ a r c l a f a i Tolly,
I
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118,000 men; -and the Second Army, commanded by Bagration,
35,060 men; making a total of igg,ooo. In-the course of the
retreat this army received reinforcements; nevertheless, when,
later on, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration joined forces in
Smolensk, they had no more than i~g,ooomen at their disposal. Sickness and casualties in fighting had reduced their
numbers.
possessed 'adequate artillery .and good
.Thez. gunneb. It may be said that at no time in the first half of the
nineteenth century was the Russian artillery so well matched
.with the French as it was in 1812, 1813 and 1814. At the time
Napoleon crossed the Niemen the Russian troops were, relatively speaking, better supplied with artillery than Napoleon's
army. The Russian army had approximately seven guns per
thousand men, whereas the ratio in Napoleon's army was no
higher than four per thousand. The absolute number-of guns,
of course, was higher in Napoleon's army, for the simple reason
that at the opening of hostilities his army was far larger than
the Russian.
Barclay de ~ 0 1 left
1 ~Vilna for the Drissa camp on June 26
and arrived there on July lo with an army of ioo,ooo men.
On July 16 he left the camp with all his troops, his baggage
and supplies, and with the Tsar himself, and marched in thc
direction of Vitebsk. For ten weary days de Tolly marched
from Drissa through Polotsk to Vitebsk in the sultry July heat,
and on the way he received reports from his spies and scouts
that Napoleon with his main force was also marching toward
that town. He knew that Napoleon would arrive at Vitebsk
with 200,000 men, whereas he would have barely 75,000 men.
for he was compelled to allocate 25,000 men-one-fourth of his
forces-to reinforce Count Wittgenstein, who was guarding the
road to St. Petersburg.
In the first, and for Russia the most dangerous, period of
the war, the Prussian generals, whose forces formed part of the
French army corps commanded by Marshal Macdonald, servilely carried out the behests of Napoleon. As a reward for
their services they, like their pious sovereign Frederick William
'4
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111, hoped to received a large slice of Russian territory-the
whole of the Baltic Region. At first the Russians thought that
the Prussians were only pretending to take an active part in
the war in order to placate Napoleon, and would not seriously
fight against Russia. But to their surprise they found that they
were mistaken, The Prussians not only conscientiously killed
Russian soldiers, but zealously looted the region they occupied
-"made a clean sweep of it," as an eye-witness put it. Later,
when Napoleon had barely left Russia, they swung over to the
side of R d a .
On July go Wittgenstein fought a successful engagement
against Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio, and pushed him
back to Polotsk.
De Tolly and Bagration, hard pressed by the enemy, retreated on Vitebsk and Moghilev in the frightful heat, their
troops half-starving and going without fresh water for several
days on end. Only an hour after the retreat of the Russian
troops from Vilna did Napoleon arrive there with his vanguard. Here he stayed from June 08 to July 16.
Quite early in July Napoleon was able to experience all the
inconveniences of the continental climate and the lack off
roads in Russia. The frightful heat was followed by heavy
rains, which made the movement of troops extremely difficult.
Sickness thinned the ranks of Napoleon's army in the very
first days of the campaign.
Worst of all, however, were the unexpected *difficultiesthat
arose in connection with the supply of food and fodder. The
baggage trains could not keep up with the rapidly advancing
army, and as a result men and horses were deprived of their
regular rations. Driven by hunger, the men began to plunder
the inhabitants, even while they were still marching through
the territory of Napoleon's "ally," Prussia. But\ in none of
Napoleon's campaigns, except the Italian campaign of 1796-97
and the Egyptian campaign of 1798-99, was looting conducted
on the scale and intensity that it was in the regions occupied
in Russia in 18I P. The discipline of the Grand Army in no
way resembled the traditional discipline of Napoleon's troops.
15

It did not consist of volunteers, as was the case with previous
armies, nor was it a purely 'French army. Its men were drawn
from numerous nationalities jrom at1 over Europe.
While in Vilna Napoleon had to draw up two plans of
operation; one against Bagration, who with the Second Army
was retreating toward Nesvkh, and the other against de Tolly,
who on June 26 had left Vilna with the First Army in the
direction of the Drissa camp.
Bagration's position seemed desperate. He had in all about
40,000 men, for at the very beginning of the retreat two
divisions were thrown back to Volyn. He was being pursued by Marshal Davout with an army of 70,000 men; by
Yoniatowski with an army of 35,000 men; by Jerome, King of
Westphalia, and brother of Napoleon, with an army of 16,000
men; by Grouchy with 7,000 men; and by General LatourMaubourg with 8,000 men. Nevertheless, he got away. Napoleon was furious with his incompetent brother for failing to
overtake and defeat Bagration.
On July 8, Marshal Davout occupied Minsk and thence
marched to the River Berezina. Again Bagration found him-self in a critical situation. He retreated' with his army strung
out along the narrow roads between the marshes. When
Napoleon heard of the position of Bagration's army he exclaimed: "I've caught himJ" Evidently, he <forgot at that
moment that he himself had called Bagration the best general
in the Russian army. Davout stayed in Minsk four days. By a
skillful maneuver Bagration turned sharply to the south,
reached the Berezina near the town of Bobruysk, crossed the
river 'at this point, and marched toward the Dnieper. Ordering
Rayevski to hold up Davout's forces near the village of
Dashkovka, he himself marched to Novy Bykhov, at which
point he crossed the Dnieper on July 25. Another part of his
army crossed the river at Stary Bykhov.
On July 23, Rayevsky, with but one army corps, held out
for ten hours in a stubborn battle at Dashkovka against five
divisions from the m y corps of Marshals Davouf and Mortier, who were pressing him very hard. At one critical moment
r6
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in the battle the musketeers, subjected to a hail of bhllets,
wavered. It was said and written at the time that Rayevsky
in a ffash seized both his sons by the arms, rushed forward
with them, rallied the men and-ledthem in a charge. The men
proved worthy of their gallant commander. ~ a y e v s kwas
~
never lavish with praise, hut in the dispatch he sent to his
superior, Bagration, - after the battle, he wrote: "I myself saw
many officers*and privates who had been twice wounded
: bandaging their wounds and returning to the battle as if to a
bean feast. I cannot sufficiently express my admiration for the
courage and skill of the Artillerymen. All were lieroes to
a man.",
. Bagration extricated himself from the ~ r e n c hpincers by
:,
crossing to the left bank of the Dnieper. Marshal Davout
"earned that Bagration had crossed' the Dnieper twenty-four
hours after the event and immediately reported this to Napoleon. This news, too, displeased the Emperor very much.
To hold up the French advance, de Tolly sent against them
the 4th Infantry Corps, commanded by Count OstemanTolstoy, and followed this up with reinforcements commanded
: by General Konovnitsin. The road from Ostrovno to the
Luchosa River was lined with the dead bodies of these two
forces but they fulfilled the task they had been sent to perform. They gave de Tolly and Bagration two extra days in
: which to draw up their plans.
On July 27, just before dawn, a courier arrived at de Tolly's
camp with a message from Bagration, who reported that he
had failed to fight his way to Moghilev and that he had
learned that Davout was starting out on a march on
Smolensk.
Several hours before receiving this dispatch from Bagration
de Tolly had received a report that Napoleon himself had
suddenly arrived at Vitebsk with the Old Guard. From the
Russian camp, fires could be seen -burning in the encamp
ments of the French Guards on the outskirts of the forest near
Vitebsk. A quick decision had to be made. To give Napoleon
battle, and without Bagration's assistance at that, meant al'

I

17

'

*

most certain defeat and, consequently,' the destruction of the
Russian army. De Tally decided to'retreat from Vitebsk to
Smolensk and to leave a csvering force of 3,000 infantry, 4,000
cavalry and 40 guns, under the command .of Count Pahlen,
about five versts from Vitebsk, to hold up Napoleon even for
a short time if the latter decided to advance from Vitebsk to
Smolensk immediately. On the night of July 27 the Russian
army quietly, and in complete darkness, stquck camp and
departed.
Napoleon was so eager to fight a general engagement at
Vitebsk that while still on the march to that town he had
ordered Murat, King of Naples, and Prince Eughne, Viceroy
of Italy, to place no obstacles in the way of the different units
'of the Russian army joining the main Russian forces.
On July 25 the French advanced on 'Vitebsk. The sultry
heat continued. The soldiers marched amidst "scorching dust,"
which brought back to the minds of the veterans of the Grand
Army their campaigns'in Egypt and in the Syrian deserts.
Late at night, on the 26th,' the French advance columns
arrived on the outskirts of the forest, on the edge of the plain
on which Vitebsk stands. The Emperor gazed at the numerous
camp fires in and around the town where the Russian army
was stationed. What will de Tolly do, he reflected. Will he
accept battle at 'Vitebsk? Will the morrow or the next day
bring another Austerlitz which will edipse even the Austrian
Austerlitz, where he had achieved victory over these very same
- .
Russians in 1805)
Came the dawn of Julv 07. Troop movements continued in
and around the city. he Russians did not attack. Napoleon,
on his part, decided to put off his attack to the next day. When
the army had turned in for the night the Emperor informed
Murat of his decision and instructed him to prepare for a
general engagement to commence at 5 A.M. On the Russian
side camp fires were burning just as they had been on the
previous night. Napoleon went to his tent while Murat went
to his cavalry outposts, which stood nearest of all to the
Russian positions.
18
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..At dawn a courier brqught Napoleon-a 'mess.age..from Murat
informing.hkn.that in the nigha de Tolly had ,retreated from.
Vitebsk. That meant that :de:Tolly must be pursued.and if
possible defeated before he could join Bagration. If the two
forces succeeded in uniting, then both must be defeated,
In the beginning of August Napoleon informed his marshals
that he intended to march on Smolensk. Murat was.entirely in
favor of continuing the- pursuit of the Russian army, but
Berthier, Duroc, Daru and Caulaincourt were emphatically
opposed to launching another attack. Rarely did they dare to
express their disagreemeqt with their sovereign as definitely
and e'mphatically as they did on this occasion. Respectfully,
but firmly, Marshal Duroc argued that the Russians were
obviously enticing the Grand Army far into the country, where
doom awaited it. He was backed by Berthier. Both marghals
warned the Emperor about the frightful loss of horses, the
shortage of forage, the dislocation of the food supply for the
army, about the poverty-stricken character of the' country in
which they were fighting and which, moreover, the Russians
were deliberately devastating, the vast dimensions of the country, and so forth. And Duroc drew the Emperor's attention
particularly to the sinister fact that Alexander was not suing
for peace. T o all this Napoleon replied that he had calculated
all the dangeq, but was sure that the campaign would end
at Smolensk.
.
Nevertheless, for several days Napoleon issued ~o orders
to the army either to move from Vitebsk, or to make prepamtions for a long stay there. Although he had decided on his
line of action, he dallied and seemed to be waiting for some
impeps.
The impetus came. On August 10, the Emperor received a
report to the effect that General Sebastia~ihad-suddenly been
attacked by Russian cavalry near Inkov and had suffered severe
losses. This revived the hope that the Russians had taken a
stand somewhere on the left bank of the Dnieper. Napoleon
immediately ordered the army to advance. .On August 13, the
first units left Vitebsk.
'

The conqueror entered Central Russia. Smolensk, which
had so many times in past centuries blocked the road to the
invader; the ancient city which had not seen a foe before its
walls for two hundred years, made preparations to meet its
most formidable enemy. But its walls and battlements wercb
destined to collapse under blows such as it had never experienced before.
I

THE BATTLE OF SMOLENSK

AKING cover in the forests and performing intricate
maneuvefs in order to conceal his line of march from the
Russians, Napoleon tried to reach Smolensk in a series of rapid
marches, but was held up by the stubborn resistance of the
small force commanded by General Neverovsky. After being
driven from the village of' Lad and then from the .village of
Krasnoye, Neverovsky, heroically defending himself against
- French forces at least five times superior to his own, retreated
toward ~molensk.Count Sbgur, a member of Napoleon's entourage and an eye-witness, described this as a "lion's
The Russian soldiers showed utter contempt for
line of retreat was strewn with Russian bodies. Another French
chronicler of this retreat wrote:

T
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"The Russian .horsemen, together with their horses; seemed
to be rooted.to the ground. . . . A number of ~ u preliminary
r
attacks failed. . . . Each time the [retreating] Russians suddenly
turned round .on us and threw us back with their musket
fire.''

Bagration learned that Napoleoh had sent considerable
' forces to ~orogobuzh,
'northeast of Smolensk, in' order to cut
; the high-road to Moscow. He immediately advanced to 'fore. stall this move. He had few troops at his command, but whqt
, perturbed him most was the conviction that. de Tolly wofiId
. surrender Smolensk. He- therefore ordered Rayevsky's corps to
march out of Smolensk'to-meet the advancilig French. Just at
, that moment he received a dispatch from Neverovsky stating
that on August -15 the French aarniy had attacked. his corpsat
.

-

Krasnoye, that he was now making a fighting retreat, and was
in need of imnhediate assistance. Assistance was sent, but it
zimived too late. The remnants of Neverovsky's force were
merged with that of Rayevsky's, which was 13,000 strong.
That night Rayevsky and Never~vskysaw an endless lihe of
cainp fires on theshorimn. This was Napoleon and his whole
army encamping for the night, obviously in preparation for a
march by direct route on Smolensk. It was not certain, however, whether Napoleon would wait until the morning .or
suddenly strike camp and maich on the city in the middle
of the night.
Rayevsky had under his command a force of 'only q,ooo
men, whereas at this moment Napoleon had a force of iB~,om.
The main Russian army had already started on its retreat from
Smolensk' to Moscow. Nevertheless, Rayevsky decided to defend himself.
On the morning of August I 6,Napoleon was already before
the walls of ~molensk.Rayevsky learned that Bagration was
hastening to his assistance and expected to be in the vicinity
of Smolensk by the evening. De Tolly was also marching
toward the city.
At 6 A.M. on August 16, Napoleon began to bombard Smolensk, and soon after launched the first assault. The first
line of defense was held by Rayevsky's division. The battle
continued with varying intensity all day. But all Napoleon's
efforts to capture the city that day failed. Night set in and
both sides suspended operations in order to prepare for another stiff encounter .next day. At night, on de Tolly's orders,
Rayevsky's corps, which had -suffere&enormous loss&, was relieved by the' corps commanded by Dokhturov.
The battle before the walls of Smolensk whs resumed at
4 A.M. on August 17 and from that time until 5 P.M.-for
thirteen hours-an almost incessant artillery duel was fought.
By 5 P.M. all the suburbs of Smolensk were in flames; 'even
parts of the city itself were burning. Assault Mlowed assault,
each pmceded by a heavy bombardment, but the Russian
troops repulsed every attack. Night set in again, but the bom42

bardment and conflagration continued with greater intensity
than ever.
suddenly, at midnight, the Russian guns ceased fire and then
followed explosions of incredible force. De Tolly had ordered
hii army to blow up the powder magazine and to withdraw
from the city. The Russian troops had been fighting with
splendid spirit and did not in the least regard themselves as
defeat& when the order to retreat was received; but de Tolly
realized that Napoleon was trying to force him into a general
engagement in order to achieve another Austerlitz on the
banks of the Dnieper. Bagration, with part of the army, was
still on the march to Dorogobuzh and would obviously arrive
too late. For these reasons de Tolly decided to withdraw.
At dawn on August 18 Napoleon woke up expecting a general engagement to take place, but his adjutants pointed across
the river to the dense masses of troops marching eastward
from Smolensk. He realized that de Tolly had again avoided
battle and that the Russian command had used Smolensk
merely as a screen to hold up his pursuit. Again the Russian
army had slipped through his fingers.
.4t dawn on August ig Marshal Ney made a detour and1
emerged to the east of ~molensk.On learning that the Russian
army was retreating along the Moscow road he immediately
went in pursuit. Near Valutino Hill he was held up by the
Russian rearguard. A battle ensued which lasted the whole of
that day. The Russians put up a stubborn resistance and inflicted on the French losses amounting to 7,000 men. The
Russians lost about 6,000. When dusk set in the artillery
ceased fire. At night de Tolly withdrew from his positions and
retreated eastward. Describing this battle, Count Skgur wrote
that "the Russians covered themselves with almost as much
glory in their defeat as we in our victory."
This was an ominous sign for Napoleon. He had to ask
himself: Had the Russians been put to flight at least once since
the war began? Could the battle of Krasnoye and Neverovsky's
retreat really be called a victory for the Grand Army? Had
there been cases anywhere else, except in Spain, where individ-
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ual men kept a wholevregimentat bay, and where it was neces' sary to bring up cannon against individual soldiers surrounded
by enemies, as was the case 'with a Russian chasseur ai.Smol e d ? In fact, the battle of Valutino Hill should be regarded
not *asa victory but as a strategic defeat for the French grmy.
Napoleon had sent General Junot's corps to make a detour
around.Smolensk for ihe purpose of ireventing de Tolly and
Bagration from joining forces on the Moscow road. But ~ u n o t
. arrived too late. When he crossed the marshes and emerged on
the MOSCOW
road the two Russian armies had joined and tvere.
already marching toward Dorogobuzh.

BORODINO

N AUGUST 1 7 Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Kutuzov's name was on everybody's lips not only among the aristocracy in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but also among the officers
of the army, and even among the rank and file. Everybody
knew that the Tsar detested Kutuzov and that the latter reciproated this sentiment but, in view of circumstances, the
Tsar was obliged to thrust aside his personal antipathies.
At the time Kutuzov received his new appointment he was
67 years ~f age. His great predecessor Suvorov hadJappraised
him far higher than many other of his officers. "He is very
shrewd, and very clever! Nobody can fool him!" Suvorov used
to say of him. The aged gelieral was distinguished for his great
talents as a strategist, his cool, indomitable courage, his great
military experience, aqd his wide popularity among the people and the army. In this war he counted on the fact that the
Russian peasants would rather burn their grain, hay and
houses than sell provisions and forage to the enemy, and that
in this seared desert the enemy would meet his doom. But he
knew that at present neither he nor anybody else would be
allowed to surrender Moscow without a fight. The temper of
the people, primarily of the peasants, and the temper of the
army was such that it would be utterly impossible for him to
retreat without at least one general engagement. One of his
contemporaries wrote that "whoever proposed that Moscow be
surrendered without 'a shot would be' regarded by the whole
people as a traitor."
As the Russian army was moving from Gzhatsk toward
Mozhaisk it was reinforced by abbut 15,000 men under the
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command of Miloradovich, and by a force of io,ooo Moscow
militia, under the commarid of Count Markov. On receiving
these reinforcements Ku tuzov definitely decided to acckpt
battle. The Russian army halted and turned to face Napoleon's advancing army.
On reaching Gzhatsk on.September 2, Napoleon ordered a
rollcall to be taken of all his fighting forces situated in the
town and its immediate vicinity. The number proved to be
log,ooo infantry, 30,000 cavalry and 587 'guns. Meanwhile, the
straggling units were catching up with the main force.
On September 3, covered by the successful and stubborn
resistance of their rear guard, commanded by General Konovnitsin, Kutuzov, de Tolly and Bagration. reached the Kolotsk
Monastery and there began to entrench themselves.
Napoleon followed hot on Konovnitsin's heels, keeping him
constantly engaged in battle. On September 5 it was reported
to him that his vanguard had reach a redoubt. This was the
Shevardino ~ e d o u b twhich
,
at the time Napoleon arrived was
defended by a small force of - 11,000 men under the command
of Prince Gorchakov. These had been left behind as a covering
force to conduct rear-guard actions.
Against this small force Napoleon hurled over 35,000 picked
troops, and when the battle was at its height he sent additional
reinforcements to the attacking colummi. The battle lasted the
whole day of September 5. The French made several cavalry
assaults on the redoubt, but these were repulsed. Then two
French infantry divisions and three regiments of the 3rd Division were brought up. These pushed back Neverovsky's
division, which occupied the approaches, and then stormed the
redoubt itself. The Russian defendeh met the charge of the
French troops with impetuous counter charges, rushing to certain death with bayonets leveled and with wild cries of
''hurrah!" The Russian gunners kept up their fire until the
last moment, and when the French broke into the retrenchments they did not retreat, as they could easily have done, b u t
entered into a hand to hand fight and were cut down at their
guns. It w a ~long after midnight before Bagration received
0
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Kutuzov's order to cease-hisresistance and retreat.

he Frencli

simply could ' w t understand -how this unequal .battle couM
- .
have Jasted so .I-.
:
:-. '
.. . .
.On the same day, the ~ & s i a nrear-guard commanded by
Konovn,$da wais again attacked near the Kolot~kMonastery
and forced bad to the village of mrodino.
Napokeon. pursued the -~usoianatmy with three dense
co1umrw:The -Imperjal-GeneralStaff had taken up its quartin .the village of - Valuyevo. Here .Napdeon received a dispatch
*
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from . the Shevardino Redoubt . stating that ''not a . single
prisoner was taken." On September 6. ~apoleonrode up to ;he
redoubt and, evidently desiring to verify the information:hehad received on the previous.day, asked: "How'many Russian
prisoners were taken yesterday?" !.'They do not surrenh, Sire,"
came the reply.
The--French spent all of September 6 in preparations for
battle. Napoleon did not go to bed that night. At dawn a
courier arrived from Marshal-- .Ney with a message?asking
whether he should launch the battle. The Russians had halted,
he reported. "NOWwe have them!" exclaimed Napoleon.
"Fonvardl We will open the gates of Moscow!" At that moment the sun rose behind the Russian canip. "Behold the sun
of Austerlitz!" exclaimed the Emperor.
Few battles in history up to &at time could be compared.
with the battle of Bordino for its bloodiness, its fkrocity
and its consequences. In this battle,. however, Napoleon not
only failed to break-the spirit of the Russian *army,but also
failed to terrorize the Russian people. A f t e r - B ~ ~ f'and
i o the
fall of Moscow their resistance to.the eneqy b~carrhe'stillmore
. Z
- .> .--.
.
intense,
. .
A t 5 A.M. a-fierce battle was opened on the left flank of the
~ u s i a narmy,:where ~ a p t t i o d
forces were p ~ t e dnear the
Semenovsky Rauine. Here Napoleon' had.sent . Marshal$ Da-'
v o ~ t ,Murat
.
and. Ney: - The first 'assault$were repulsed by 'thie
Rusdiad artillery and ..heavymusket +fire.:!MBrshzb Davout fell:
he .was:rwounde&in athe -head %ndhis horse w& 'killed &I&'
him. In the first assaults on .-EMgncation's positiond:the,F**&
=
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lost many officers, including several generals and colonels. Thc
fortifications around. Semenovsky Ravine, af terwards known
. as "Bagration's fl&che,"-were hastily put up, but they were'.
defended so fiercely that from 5 A.M. to i i:go A.M. all the
desperate assylts of #theFrench were repulsed with frightful
losses. By 7 A.M. Napoleon .had concentrated nearly 150 guns
against this position. After-*along preliminary bombardment,
enormous forces were hurled against the ravine and the fl&che.
Overwhelming forces were hukled against Vorontsov's *and
Neverovsky's divisions, which were overthrown. and crushed.
Iq this fight Neverovsky put up a desperate resistance and his battalions made repeated bayonet charges. Murat, Ney and
Davout asked Napoleon for reinforcements, but the latter refused, for he was displeased with the fact that the-fleche had
not yet been captured. .
Fierce and bloody fighting raged. The -fl&che,bestrewn with
the corpses of w n and horses, changed hands several times.
Those who knew Bagration and who saw him during these
feightful hours had.no doubt whatever that he would hold the
fl&e or die in the attempt.
Napolean neither would nor could abandon his plan of
breaking through the Russian lines on the left flank and then
-. of concentrating all his forces on the.center. The number of
French guns concentrated on this part of the line was now
increased to 400, more than two-thirds of Napoleon's artillery,
and another general assault ,on'the fleche was ordered.
"Here an important event occurre&" relates a Pafticipanr
in- this battle. "Realizing what the marshals were aiming at,
and seeing the menacing advance of the French forces, Prince
Bagration,made a desperate decision. An order was given, and
the whole of our left flank, a 1 along the line, marched forward
at a -quick pace with leveled bayonets." The .Russian attack
was repulsed, and Davout ordered a counter-attack. The French
grenadiets, refraining from firing in order.to save ti*, hurled
themselves upon the. flkhe. They were &owed d&m by 'Russian bu1iets. A-hailof chain shot i v a s poured upon the Rhssian
defenders from t . k French batteries;
,
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.4t that moment a fragment of a shell hit Bagration and
broke his hip bone. For a while he tried to hide from his
troops the fact that he had been wounded in order that they
should not become dismayed, but blood poured from his
wound and he began slowly to slip from his horse. His adjutants managed to catch him before he fell, and carried him
away.
This was the crucial moment of the battle. The soldiers not
only loved Bagration more than any other of their commanders in this war, except perhaps Kutuzov, but they believed him
to be invincible. Witnesses relate that "the spirit seemed to
leave the whole left flank" when Bagration died.
'The left flank was broken. From all sides Kutuzov received
reports of heavy losses. The soldiers had fought with amazing
valor and thousands had fallen. As was the case at Smolensk,
wounded soldiers stolidly bore their pain- and stuck to their
posts in spite of the orders of their oRcers to go to the rear.
The officers were no less staunch than their men on that day.
Aftet the capture of the flkche, the next important episode
in the battle of Borodino was the fight for Rayevsky's battery,
-stationed on a hill in the center of the Russian line; The
French captured the village of Borodino, but were driven
out of it by the Russian chasseurs. The French made another
assault, captured the village again, and this time were able
to hold ,it.. Eughne, Viceroy of Italy, then crossed the Koloch
River and led an assault on the great battery, which had been
subjected to repeated attack since lo o'clock that morning.
Under General Bonamy the French took the battery by
assault, but were repulseci. They captured it a second time,
but again they were repulsed. During this assault Colonel
Monakhtin, Chief of Staff of the 6th Army Corps, received
two bayonet wounds, but at the third assault of the French he
managed to shout to the Russian soldiers, pointing to the
battery: "Boys, imagine that this is Russia; defend her with
your lives!" At that moment a bullet entered his stomach, and
he was carried off the battlefield. This brave officer lived only
a few days longer. On learning that Moscow had been aban29
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doned to the enemy lqe;-ti,m the-bandages from hts-woun~s
.
and 'died.
Enholov.drove Broussier's division out of Rayevsws battery
and from the approaches to it. General Bonamy, his' body
pierced in 'many places with bayonet wounds, was 'taken
prisoner. Napoleon demanded the destruction 'of ~ a ~ e v. .s k $ s
battery at all costs.
.
At o P.M., Napoleon ordered his artillery to occupy the positicmi-'bound the Bagration flkhe, which the French had captured after the death of Bagration. From this point a hellish
fire mowed down the Russian troops; .but never before had
Russian soldiers, privates and officers alike, shown ..su'ch
. contempt 'for danger and death as they did on that' day.
The French fire grew in intensity. It became obvious' that
Napoleon was.determined to capture'.Rayevsky's battery and,
after achieving victory in this 'atiillery duel, to break up the
Rubian army with artillery fire and .put it to flight. But this
didmot happen. The Russian drmy retreated in perfect order.
. By g P.M. three-fourths of the '&fenden of the battery had
been killed and the rest thrown ba&. The battery remained
in the hands of the French. But the Russians had not fled from
the battlefield, their guns ' had not .been silenced.
Night set 'in. The biggest battle that Napoleon had ever
fought .was drawing to a close. But what was the: result?
Neither Napoleon nor his marshals could say definitely. one
ofbthemwas conscious of a feeling of .victory. The marshils
conversed grumblingly with one another: Mdrat said .that all
day long the. Emperor had been quite . ' ~ n r e ~ ~ i z a.&
~ ;e y
:.
said that the --Emperorhad forgotten his busineis.
Th,e thunder .of artilletyiaria' 'the;:heavy"figh€ingw& heard
on both.*@ides
un ti1 'nightfzillj biit 'th:eRussians had w,in'ten. ..
.-..
tiom.:of fetfeating, let -afoneof *fleeingin panic: ''
. That:bvehing Napoleon rbd* &er the batt~efield,.&brose
and
gloomy, fid%ayinga wdrd to Ms'atttenkhnts; his gkne.rals dared
not. 'ii~!t&~upt
'his' refldctimi The*'
@bans' .'and
pf the
wouirded wereheard on all sid&. The ~ u s s i i hwotilidg(lrho~ever, arnazd-the genirali.. i c ~ & kBid
f not utter a groan?
.3b
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one of them 1,ater. "Perhaps, being far.away from their own
men, they had less expectation ,of mercy. But the truth is that
they seemed to
wounded, but only joo were taken prisoner. Shortly before
his death Napoleon, while reminiscing, said: "The most frightful battle I ever fought was that near Moscow. The French ,deserved their victory, but the Russians deserved the title of ifivincibles."
In the long run, the battle of Borodino proved to be a great
victory for the Russian people over the dictator of Europe.
It markedthe beginning of that incredibly difficult task of
overthrowing Napoleoa that was finally accomplished three
years later.
At night, ~a;>oleon
was the first to withdraw his troops from '
the battlefield; he did this before Kutuzov issued his order
to retreat. The Russian army retreated from Borodino to
Moscow and beyond in p e r k t order; but the main thing wasthat the spirit of the Russian troops had not been shaken in
the least. Borodino had merely served to fan their hatred of
the invader and to intensify their thirst for revenge.

'

THE FIRE OF MOSCOW

FTER retiring a little way from the battlefield both the
French and Russian armies remained inactive for several hours. Both sides were engaged in counting up their
losses, checking the figures and ascertaining the results of the
battle.
Corps commanders and adjutants came to Kutuzov one
after another and their reports drove the aged Field Marshal
to the conclusion that he must surrender Moscow without even
attempting to hold up Napoleon's forces. T o be more precise,
he understood that now he would be allowed to surrender
Moscow without another battle. The Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Corps had been' almost entirely annihilated. The other
units of his army had also suffered heavy losses. On the other
hand, Kutuzov learned that Napoleon's Guard was still intact,
as i t had not taken part in the battle. Next day he also learned
that Napoleon's right wing was outflanking the Russian left
wing. It became utterlv impossible to stay here longer without
giving battle; but it i a s also impossible to give battle at the
moment. ~ u t u z o vdecided to retire on Moscow.
He reached the village of Fili, on the outskirts of Moscow,
and here, on September 13, 1813, he called his most important
generals to a council of war to discuss whether the Russian
army should enter into another engagement or retreat beyond
Moscow and allow the city to fall into Napoleon's hands. In
submitting this question he uttered the opinion he had h ~ l d
all along, but hitherto had not expressed to anyone: "As long
as the army exists and is capable of offering resistance to the
enemy we can'hope for a favorable consummation of the war;
but if the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish."
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'The council of war lasted only a little over an hour. Rather
unexpectedly for those present, the Field Marshal abruptly
closed the. proceedings and, rising from his seat, announced
that he therewith ordered a retreat. During the rest of the day
Xutuzov spoke to nbbody. At night he returned to the hut in
which he had taken up his quarters, but he did not .go to bed.
Several times that night he was heard to weep.
The lastynits of the retreating Russian army .were crossing
the bridge of the small river Yauza that runs into the Moscow
River when General Miloradovich, the commander of the
rear guard, received information that the French cavalry was
entering Moscow through the Dorogomilov Gate. All day
apd night, and well into the next day, an endless stream of
a3$umanity flowed out of Moscow across the Yauza Bridge.
.%utuzov
..
led the Russian army southward to Krasnaya Pakhra
ind thence to the old Kaluga road. At night he was drinkp!g tea in the village of Uopa, and the peasarits sitting around
him pointed horrorstricken to the glare reflected in the sky
bf Moscow burning in the distance. "Kutuzov, shifting his
kap with a vigorous gesture, answered: 'It's a pity, of course;
but You wait, I'll break his head.
.' "
On September g, Napoleon arrived at Mozhaisk and left
, on the 12th. He then hastened after his army, which was,
marching to Moscow, and caught up with it when the vanguard was approaching Poklonnaya Hill. This was on Septem%be?13. He had spent the night in the village of Vyazem, and
all that night and the next morning the vanguard of the
French army streamed past the village on the way to Moscow.
he and his aides ascended PoAt 2 P:M. on September
klonnaya Hill and saw the panorama of Moscow spread out to
their view. A bright sun lit up the vast city and caused its
innumerable gilded domes to gleam. The Old Guard that followed behind Napoleon's suite, forgetting discipline, broke
ranks and scrambled up the hill shouting in a thousand voices:
'',MOSCOW!
Moscow!'' Riding to a higher mound, Napoleon
halted, and he, too, with unconcealed triumph, exclaimed:
aMoscowl"
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The men on that hill at that hour were ready to believe
that the resistance of the Russian people had been broken
and that the signing of an armistice, and then of peace, was
only a matter of a few days.
Meanwhile, the sun began to set and the Frenchmen
gathered on the hill began to comment among themselves on a
rather strange circumstance. Murat had already entered the
kty, and in a parallel column the corps commanded by Viceroy
Eughne were pouring in. Napoleon wanted to receive the keys
of the city here on Poklonnaya Hill, and the first thing Murat
and Eughne were to have done on entering the city was to
arrange for a civic deputation to escort them into the city.
But no deputation came. Suddenly, incredible news spread,
first among the Guards, then among Napoleon's retinue, and
finally reached Napoleon: no deputation from the inhabitants
of Miscow need be expected because there were no inhabitants in Moscow. The whole population had abandone?
the city!
Murat had entered Moscow at noon. His cavalry advanced
warily, fearing an ambush and sudden attack. But silence
reigned hour after hour, while the French army poured into
the city in an endless flood. Only when the leading detachment reached the Kremlin were a few shots fired from behind
the closed gates. The French broke dawn the gates with a '
cannon ball and killed the few .men who were ,there. Who
these people were is not known to this day. When the French
broke into the fortress, one of its defenders flung himself upon
a French officer with extraordinary fury, tried to strangle him
and bit his hand through and through. He was killed like the
'rest.
Toward evening Napoleon was informed that the French
troops had occupied the city without meeting any resistance.
He spent his first night in Moscow in an abandoned house
near the Dorogomilov Gate. He was in a very gloomy mood.
"What an awful wilderness!" he exclaimed when he saw the
deserted streets.
Before he went to bed several adjutants and orderlies ar9
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rived -from different parts of the city remote. from each other. ,
All of them reported the same thing: Fires were starti& in the city. '' ~t first the Emperor thought that his soldiers, 'scattered
thrkgh the city, were looting the abandoned hbuses and fhe
fire$ Were due-to their carelessness. But he had not $t man- '
aged to .fall asleep when, at three .o'clock in the-morning, he
was informed that Gostinny Dvor, in the1commercial district of Moscow, was on fire, that houses were burning which
French soldiers had never entered, or in the.vicinity where no
French soldiers had yet been. A strong wind was blowing
which swept the sparks from the burning houses to neighboring buildings 8nd set fire to them too.
' he sun' rose, and 'in the daylight the glare of the 'hies'was
hidden by a thick pall of smoke. No doubt 'a number 'of
people had remained in ~ o s c o wwho at great risk to the'ir
lives were determined to 'destroy all they could rather than
allow anything to fall into the hands of the enemy. .Bpt there
is no doubt also that many of the fires were startedi by the
French soldiers when they pillaged the abandon*:.. houses
.
. and
shops.
- The 'conflagration grew. The whole of kitai @rod, the
commercial.center of Moscow,, was ablaze. on the evening of
September 15 the granaries on the banks'of the ~ o s c o w~ i w r
caught fire' and the sparks blew up a large grenade a'nd baqb
dump that had 'been abandoned by the Russian garrison. So
strong was the glare of the codiag-ration that some pans of the
city seemed to be bathed in daylight: .
That night Napoleon' was rqused fikm 4is Sleep ,byathe
bright light that shone through his windowa'inthe Kremlin
Palace. He passed from window to window facing different
p a t s of .the city and &all sides hewas Amos; blinded by. the
.
glare of enormous tongues df ' f l a k ih&ting up to the sky.
He had taken u p his quarters in the Kremlin together yith
his attendants a d the Old.Guard. .Th=F**& '&il&qixtorFs
.
had been' transfe'ired here, too; This .&eatdd' q s~rioug,
M f r
for - higjelf: his suite, ;his' &&!!I Staff ,a*&
,old.-&p@,
for the .kitid
:still "sri-o&'and &j bl&ing &
; flames
I
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palace of the tsars, in tHe Kremlin!" He knew the
place that the Kremlin. held in the history of Russia and he
was reluctant to leave it after having been there less than a
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ies were heard: "The Kremlin is burning!" The Em- . cided to transfer his quarters to Peter's Palace, which .&.-.i
-:
+
':
a park situated, at that time, outside the city. He'left .the Kreinlin accompanied by his 'suite and the Old ;
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re surrounded by a sea'of fire. The flames cut us off,
xits. from the fortress and drove us back at o u r ,',;!

'

ing out to the Moscow River. By this track, Napoleon, his
officersand his guards managed to slip out of the Kremlin.
But what did they gain by that? They found. themselves
near- to the ionflagration, and could neither retreat nor
remain where they--were. But how' to go fonvard? How could
.
I
'
one plunge i n t ~this surgiri sea of fire?
"People- were running t rough .the city, stunned b y the
storm and blinded with dust, not knowing where they were,
for. the streets had vanished amidst the smoke and ruins.
Nevertheless, we had to make haste. Every moment the roar
of the Barnes grew in intensity. The only crooked street visible,
burning on all sides, seemed to lead into this hell rather than
.out-of it. The Emperor, on foot, unhesitatingly plunged into-.
this dangerous passage. He stepped out into the conflagration
amidst the noise of collapsing arches, of falling beams and of
red-hot sheet-iron roofs caving in all around him.
"We walked on burning earth between -two walls of fire.
The penetrating heat seared our eyes, which, however, we were
compelled to keep open in view of the danger. The' air was suf'focating; dust and sparks flew around, and tongues of flame
licked us on all sides. We began to breathe in short, dry gasps,
and we were almost asphyxiated by the smoke. . . ."

a

,

The conflagration raged for two more days and destroyed
nearly three-fourths of the city. Fires continued to break out
even after this, and hardly a day passed during the period
that the French were in Moscow but what fires broke out in
some part of the town or other. All this time Napoleon was in
a most somber mood. He realized that it would be more difficult now to conclude peace with the Tsar than before; but
he was not yet aware that at that moment it was not only difficult but impossible to conclude peace with Russia; that the
war which he thought had come to a close with the capture
of Moscow had only just begun for the Russian peopk.
In the prevailing situation Napoleon was confronted with
two urgent tasks of primary importance. The first was ;to
secure the -conclusion of peace, here in Mmow. The second
was to prevent the stocks of food and clothing that might
survive the fire from being looted by his own soldiers, and to
37.

resto* discipliqe-in his motley amy: Both tasks proved to be
beyond' his powers.
Tfie"fire was already subsiding in the central parts of ;the
city when Napoleon left Peter's Palace to return to the K&mlin, but it still raged on the outskirts. On the day he resinned
his residence in the Kremlin he- was informed that .Major
General Tutolmin, the head of the Moscow orphanage, had
asked for a pard to be placed near this institution to prot e a the inmates who had remained in .Moscow. Quite unexpctedly, Napoleon not only granted Tutolmin's request, but
even invited him to the Kremlin. During his conversation
with the general, Napoleon was very kind and gracious.
He asked Tutolmin whether he had any other request to
make. T o this the General replied that he would like to re:
ceive permission do send a report to the Tsarina, who was the
patroness of all the orphanages in Russia. Napoleon not 'only
consented to this, but asked Tqtolmin to add a note saying
that-he, Napoleon, respected Alexander as of old, and would
like to eonclude peace. Tutolmin wrote as he was .requested,
and sent his report off that vevday by an official of his department who, by a signed order ,of theXmperor, was allowed
to pass the French outposts.. .
This first attempt to conclude peace was totally- ulllilce
Napoleon's usual behavior, and this 'alone showed that the
.
Emperor did not feel quite 'confident. The second attempt was made two:,days after Napoleon's
cowersation with Tutolmin'.' A rich Moscow gentleman*
named Yakovlw (father,of the famous. Alexander Ivanovich
Henen) fou'nd himself and his family ..itrandid . in Moscow
and was in extfdmely straitened cir&fnstarices. He' therefore
appealed to M h h a l Mortier- for askiLtance to leave the"civ' The Marshal -%ad.' kfi&n' ~ a k h l e :in
v -~ai.is,
',and' on ihe'
streiigth . of this. aeijuaintddkd!"Kit. reported his request to
Napoleon. .~apoleonsummsned Yakovlev to' appeir -bkforki
hiin. .Yakovlev cam; and &iieated'**hiire+est.'':~a$Ikdi!r' at
fiist.gefefused
but 'ifter
yako*T&$ @d ~ ' i m ~hB'@ih:
l o ~ &df
+to rec&id& his: d&fsfa>hC tGughi f*=' $*. s i j , g n t
'

'
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and suddenly asked: "Will you take a lettqr from me to the
you a pass for yourself and .
Emperor? If you will, I will
all your family." . '
"I would accept Your Majesty's proposal, but I cannot guarantee to ful'fill it," answered Yakovlev.
, "Will you give me your word of honor that you will make
every possible effort to deliver the letter in person?" asked
Napoleon. "I promise on my honor, Sire," answered Yakovlev.
On September 00, Napoleon wrote a letter to Alexander,
and Yakovlev took it with him. That letter reached its destination. Although. not a direct proposal for peace, it was
a peace proposal nevertheless. But Alexander left Tutolmin's .
report as well as ~ a ~ o l e o n letter
';
unanswered.
Two weeks elapsed. On the morning of October 5 two
French officers appeared at the Russian outposts under a white
flag and stated that General Marquis ~ a u i s t o nhad arrived
and desired to meet Field Marshal Kutuzov. .The meeting was
arranged, and an interesting 'conversation ensued. Lauriston
stated that it was not the French who had set fire to Moscow.
The Russian general replied that he: was aware of this; the fire
had been started by the Rtissians who held Moscow in no
higher estimation than any other city in the empire. Lauriston then said: 'You must not think that our position is des'perate; our armies are about equal." T o this Kutuzov replied
that the Russian people regarded the French in the same light
as, the Tartars who had invaded Russia under Genghiz Khan.
"But surely there is some difference?.' expostulates Lauriston.
"The Russian people do not see any," answered the Field
Marshal.
With these impressions on his mind, and fully 'conscious
of the utter fruitlessness of his visit to Kutuzov, Lauriston
~
returned to the Kremlin to report to Napoleon. B U Napoleon
was so keen on concluding 'pace h Moscow-so as to be able
to pose as,victor-that he resolved to write to Alexander urging him to repli to his proposal. On October 20, fifteen days
after ~auriston'sconversation with Kutuzov, Colonel Berterni
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was sent to the Russian Field Marshal with a letter from
Marshal Berthier, Chief of Napoleon's General Staff, asking
whether a reply had been received from the Tsar and urging
the necessity of "restoring order9'-of concluding peace. Kutuzov replied to Berthier stating that no reply had been received
and that the delay was due to the distance and the difficulties
of traveling on the autumn roads. T o this he added:
/

"It is difficult to restrain a people which has been infuriated
by all that it has seen; a people that has known no war within
its frontiers for three hundred years; which is prepared to sacrifice itself for its native land and which draws no distinction
between what is customary and what is not costumary in ordinary warfare."
Strictly speaking, in this period, from Odober 6, when
Lauriston returned from his conversation with Kutuzov, to
October 14, when he began to issue orders which' clearly
indicated that he was preparing to evacuate Moscow, Napoleon did not expect any reply from St. Petersburg; nor was it
possible for a reply.to arrive earlier than the iSth, 19th or the
loth at the very outside. The Emperor was extremely i m tated. For whole nights he paced the grounds of the Krem- '
.lin discussing all sorts of new 'plans; b u t to Count Daru he .
confessed the real &use of his perturbation. The question
uppermost in his mind was: how to extricate himself from
the situation? How could he who had been accustomed only
to attack and to conquer now start a retreat?
On October 14 Napoleon instructed Berthier to repeat his
order that not a single French battery on the way to the
Grand.Amy be allowed to pass beyond Smolensk, and that
beginning with October "7, no artillery or cavalry units should
be sent to Moscow, but they be kept at Mozhaisk, Gzhatsk
or Vyazma (wherever this order found them). "The Army
will move to a different position," stated the order. The .
wounded were evacuated from Moscow to Mozhaisk. .
On October 18 Napoleon was holding a review of Marshal
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Ney's corps in the courtyard of the Kremlin when suddenly
the sound of artillery fire reached his ears. Shortly after, an
adjutant arrived post haste with the information that Kutuzov
had suddenly left Tarutino, had attacked Murat and had defeated him.
Actually, the sound of guns that reached Napoleon emanated from the positions occupied by the vanguard of the
French army on the banks of the River Chernishna under
the command of Murat. This force, consisting of about 22,o m men, had been standing here in complete inactivity since
September rq. Kutuzov had left it in peace, and Murat, too,
had refrained from iaunching any operations against Kutuzov's forces in Tarutino.
The Russian generals had taken Lauriston's visit to Kutuzav
as evidence that the French army was in difficulties, and from '
that day Generals Bennigsen, Ermolov, Baggovut, and Plar3rovhad continuously pleaed with Kutuzov to allow them to
attack Murat's force. Kutuzov did not want an engagement,
even a minor one; but he yielded. to his officers' pleadings,
deciding beforehand, however, not to allow this skirmish to
develop into a big battle. On October 16, Kutuzov inspected
the disposition of the Russian, forces for the impending battIe
proposed by General Toll and approved it.
On October 18, General Baggovut attacked Murat's
left Bank and Orlov-Denisov his right flank. General Bennigsen undertook the general direction of 'the battle. Kutuzov
kept 'in the background. Orlov-Denisov's first cavalry charge
was successful. The French were forced back and a number
of guns were'captured. But the French rallied and met two
regiments of dismounted chasseurs with withering fire. Among
those to fall was General Baggovut. Bennigsen, judging that
he lacked sufficient forces to carry his attack to a successful
conclusion, asked Kutuzov for reinforcements, but the Field
Marshal refused, and even the earnest solicitations of Errnolov, Konovnitsin and Miloradovich in support of Bennigsen
failed to move him. Murat was thus able to retreat slowlv and
in perfect order to Spas-Kupla, on the Other side of the ~ i v e r
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Chernishna,' saving himself by heavy fire from pursuit by
0rlo.v-Denisov.
The battle of October 18-which for some reason is called
the battle of Tarutino, although that villagellay far to the
south of the scene of battle-had enormous political and moral
consequences, notwithstanding its meager military results.
Morally, it served to raise the spirits of the Russian army,.,
for it was the first. purely offensive operation undertaken by
the Russians in this war, and, above all, it was successful. .
- Politically, it gave Napoleon the final impetus that decided
him to leave Moscow. The battle of Tarutino led him to believe that Kutuzov felt s$rong eliough to launch offensive
operations and he therefore considered it advisable to move
- to the south before the Russian commander-in-chief could bar
the road.
On October ig the French army began to leave Moscow.
The column consisted of ioo,ooo troops (Mortier's garrison
of 8,000 men temporarily remained) and an immense train
6f wagons and carts piled up with loot. And in this train, '
on foot and in carriages, were thousands of foreigners with
their wives and children who had remained in Moscow in
anticipation of the arrival of the French and were now leaving
in fear of the vengeance of the Russian people.
The Emperor marched to Kaluga and on the way picked up
the remnants of Murat's force. He sent an order to Mortier
to blow 'up the Kremlin and leave Moscow to join the retreating army.
The evacuation of Moscow continued throughout the 20th
and o 1st of October. On the 2 1st explosions in the ~ r e m l i n
rent the air and made the very ground of Moscow tremble.
The arsenal and part of the Kremlin walk were blown sky
high;, fires broke out in the armory and in the ;churches. The
Nikolsky Tower, as well as the towers facing the river, were
partially destroyed. Happily, the rain had moistened the fuses
of the mines and so the explosions did not cause all the damage that Napoleon had exp;cted. Nevertheless, they were powerful enough to destroy buildigp outside the Kremlin as well
'
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as within. The tall belfry know* as "Ivan thk- rea at" escaped
destruction by sheer accident; the fuse of the mine placed
under it was moistened by the rain. After every explosion the
Kremlin Square was filled with the howls and groans of the
wounded and the dying. 'The last .explosion occbrred near
the Kremlin walls at dawn on October 23, and several hours
aftemards the last of Mortier's garrison left the city.

THE RETREAT OF NAPOLEON'S ARMY AND

THE 'SPREAD OF PARTISAN WARFARE
APOLEON'S army, ioo,ooo strong, with its artillery and
ammunition wagons, filed out of Moscow in an endless,
motley stream, followed by a long train of baggage wagons belonging to different military units. And these in turn were
followed by carts, wagons and carriages filled with loot, belonging to the marshals, generals, officers and common soldiers.
* T h e ncame more army baggage wagons, artillery, and ammunition carts-seemingly without end.
Napoleon had decided to retreat to Smolensk not by the
old road, but by the new road through Kaluga, for he had
no stores of any kind on the old road, and, besides, that road
had -been utterly wrecked. True, he had no stores on the
new road either, but as Marshal Davout expressed it, there
were still "untouched villages" on that road, whereas the old
road was a howling wilderness. "We shall to go Kaluga!"
exclaimed Napoleon. "And woe to those who stand in my
path!"
This circumstance. brings out in striking relief the importance of Kutuzov's famous maneuver-march to Tarutino. Had
he not accomplished this he would have been unable to erect
the impassable barrier south of Maloyaroslavets and cut
across the French army's line of march to Kaluga. As soon as
Kutuzov heard that Napoleon had left Moscow, he declared
.that Russia was saved. His army was augmented by the amval
of reinforcements and the enrollment of new conscripts. In
the middle of October he had a force under his command of
85,000 men, not counting the Cossacks. Napoleon's army received much fewer reinforcements.
At 1 1 P.M. on October 22 a courier arrived at Kutuzov's
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headquarters in Tarutino with a report from Dokhturov to
the effect that Napoleon was marching on Maloyaroslavets and
that he, Dokhturov, needed assistance. Ku tuzov, however,
took no action for the moment. Here he pursued the same
tactics as he had pursued six days earlier at the battle of
Tarutino. He knew, of course, that Napoleon must not be
allowed to reach Kaluga, for if he did he would capture all
the matdriel that had been prepared for the Russian army
and would, therefore, be in a much beter position to reach
Smolensk. Moreover, the Kaluga-Smolensk road would be
able to maintain the French troops much better than the
Moscow-Smolensk road.
Kutuzov ordered Dokhturov to march to the village of Fominskoye and attack the French force there, which, according
to the reports of spies, numbered 10,ooo men. On the way,
however, Dokhturov learned that Fominskoye was occupied,
not by a force of io,ooo men, but by nearly the whole of the
French army headed by Napoleon, and that the French had
already occupied Borovsk, a town much further to the south
of Fominskoye and on the direct road to Kaluga. Dokhturov
realized that it was necessary to turn at once sharply to the
south and hasten to Maloyaroslavets, between Boro~skand
Kaluga.
Fearing to disobey Kutuzov's orders, Dokhturov sent. a
courier to him to ask permission to march to Maloyaroslavets.
Kutuzov gave the required permission, but between theegoing and coming of the message much valuable time was lost.
Marching all night with but brief halts, Dokhturov reached
Maloyaroslavets at 4 A.M. on October 23. Very soon after,
however, Napoleon's army arrived and drove the Russian
chasseurs from the outskirts of the town.
Eight times that day, amidst ceaseless firing from both
sides, Maloyaroslavets changed hands, the, Russians driving
the French out at the point of the bayonet, and then the
~ r e n c hdriving out .the Russians. Dokhturov's force was
nearly at its last gasp when at 2 P.M. Rayevsky's corps came
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to his aid, and. at 4 P.I~.Kutyzov
-..*.
himself and the ..whole
.
~ u s s i a na k y arrived. - ..
..
~ & u z o vmade a detour andiiook up hi; @&ition
the
road between Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga. Night set in. The
French, holiiing the town after the eighth assault, waited in
.expectation of a general engztgcmcent. The cannon fire ceased.
The town was ablaze.
All that terrible night, gazing at the glare of the burning
town and hearing the groans of the wounded, the cries of
the French soldiers, and here and there repeated bursts of
musket fire, the Russian army waited in anticipation of
another Borodino, for there could not be the slightest doubt
that Napoleon himself was now confronting them with the
whole of his Grand Army. Early in the morning of the 25th
Field Mazshd Kutuzov ordered his army to retire about two
miles south of Maloyaroslavets. He had decided not to give
battle here. His sore aim was to liberate Russia from the invaders with a minimum of loss to the Russian army.
Miloradovich's vanguard retreated only a very short distance fromathetown. Napoleon realized that to break through
to Kaluga he would have to fight a general engagement on a
?ale no less than that at Borodino. He dked not do this and
for the first time in his life Napoleon retreated before the
prospect of a general engagement. And for the first time in
this sanguinary Russian campaign .he turned his back on the'
Russian army and, instead of the pursuer, became the pursued,
Marching through devastated towns and villages, *theFrench
army burned everything that had survived the earlier conflagration. It was already halfstarving when it started the retreat from Moscow, but on the way to Smolensk it had to
traverse a road which, as a participant in this campaign obsewed, "had already been denuded three months ago."
Gradually the food shortage among the troops assumed
catastrophic proportions. It was hunger more than the frost
that rapidly broke up Napoleon's army on the road from
Maloyaroslavets to Smolensk. Among the French forces dis'
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cipline was still maintained, but among the German and
Italian, and partly among the Polish forces, the breakdown
of discipline was assuming most menacing proportions.
Meanwhile this national war, carried on up to now by the
operations of the regular army and the unorganized operations of the peasants, assumed a new form- artisan war'
fare. This is how it began.
Five days before the battld of Borodino, Lieutenant Colonel
Denis Davydov, who for five years had served as Bagration's
adjutant, came to his superior and submitted to him a plan
to harass Napoleon's long line of communications from the
Niemen to Gzhatsk. He proposed that constant attacks and
sudden raids be made on this line, op the. French bases, on
couriers and food trains. This, he suggested, coulci be carried
out by small mounted detachments, which could rapidly go
into hiding and escape pursuit after each operation. Furthermore, he suggested that thebe irregular units could become
points of concentration of armed peasants. Bagration submitted this plan to Kutuzov, who allowed Denis Davydov a
force of fifty ~ u s s a r sand eighty dossacks. This farce set out
and, making a detour of the Grand Army, succeeded in getting
into its rear. Such was the very modest and so far imperceptible beginning of the partisan warfare, which was undoubtedly one of the decisive factors in the second phase of
the war of 1812,
Regular army officers were not the only organizers of partisan units. For example, on August 31, 1812, the Russian
rear guard w+s making a fighting retreat from Tsarevo-Zaimishche, which the French had occupi'ed. During the fighting Ermolay Chetvertakov, a -Russian dragoon, had his
horse shot under him and he was taken prisoner. At Gzhatsk,
he succeeded in escaping from the guard and made his way
to the village of Basmany, far to the south of the Smolensk
highroad along which the French army was marching. Here
the same idea of harassing Napoleon's army by means of irregular forces occurred to Chetvertakov. He de~idedto form
peasant partisan units.
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When he made his proposal to the peasants of. Basmany,
they were very suspicious of him and he obtained only one
recruit. With this recruit he made for anoth-er village. On
the road they encountered two Frenchmen, whom they' killed,
taking their clothes in order to disguise themselves. Further
on, in the village of Zadkovo, they encountered two French
cavalrymen. They killed these soldiers as well and took their
horses. In this village Chetvertakov obtained forty-seven
recruits. This small force, under Chetvertakov's command,
first wiped out a party of twelve French cuirassiers, and later
exterminated and put to flight a half-company of French
soldiers, fifty-nine strong, and captured their baggage.
These successes created a deep impression upon the peasantry in this area, so much so that even the village of Basmany now provided a53 volunteers. Chetvertakov, although
illiterate, proved to be a splendid organizer, tactician and
strategist in partisan warfare. Harassing the enemy by sudden
raids, skillfully and warily tracking down small units of
Frenchmen and exterminating them by lightning attacks, he
succeeded in preventing a large area of territory m u n d
Gzhatsk from being looted and devastated by the French.
Chetvertakov was ruthless in his operations; and, besides, the
peasants were so fierce in their hatred of the French that they
could not be restraind.
From the beginning of September to the end of November,
when Napoleon retreated across the Berezina, the partisans
undoubtedly performed great and useful service. They were
splendid and often recklessly bold scouts. One of them, Figner by name, used to disguise himself as a French soldier
and-on numerous occasions-wander around the French
camps. Another named Seslavin once silently approached
a French non-commissioned officer, picked him up and flung
him across his saddle and brought him to the Russian headquarters. Davydov, with a party of 200 to 300 men, caused
forces five times that number to flee in panic, captured their
baggage, released Russian prisoners of war and sometimes
captured enemy guns.
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The partisans obtained valuable assistance i n peir operations from t&e peasants, who' displayedeeven -greater wjllingness to cooperate with them than with the regular army.
Th& assis~ance,
was-particularly-valuabie at he beginning o f
the movement. In the Brqqnitski District, MOSCOW Gubernia,
in the villqge qf ~ i c d a - ~ ~ &ne&
e l ~vyaz&a,
,
in Bezhetsk,
Dorogobuzh and .$erpukhov,,the peasants tracked down small
enemy units, killed the French f&agers grid marauders, and
willingly provided the partisan uniw with food for men and
horses, Without this Gsistqce the paqisans would not have
achieved the resuits they dgd.
,
.
. !
.
hen came the. retreat of the Grand Army, which began
with the senseless blowing up of the K.re&lin. This malicious
act infuriated the people when they retur&d to Moscow and
.
,itas the crown. reiwd&d'
- f ~ y n:*e
d Kremlie in ruins. They
ing insult to all, they had suffered. In c o n f o 6 t y with Napoleon's orders, d l tQe t o m and villagesfon &':French army's
line of retreat were burned to the g-round: In Vyazma a
number of. Russian prisoners of war were, found locked up
in the church, which had been set on fire. The church had
escaped destruction by sheer accident. ~ h & eactions served
.further to fan the fury of the Russian people.
still
The peas+nts did not cdnfine their &perations to .helping
the partisan unik track down and 'kill.marauders and stragglers, and exterminate foragers, although it must be said that
these were the most telling blows they steck at the starving
Grapd ~ r m ~~u .~ a s iKurin,
m
a ~ e k a h tof the village of
formed a 'peasant unit, m e d it
Pavlovo. near ~o~orodoisk,
with weapons taken' from. dead ~renchmenand, with his
assistant Stqlov, led it into batde even against French cavalry,
and put them to flight. . , .
In this struggle the peasant woE& displayqd no less valor
example Vasiliia, the wife of the elder
than the men.
of a village. in the Sychevski ~isifict,~molensli~bbernia,fkequently attacked straggling French baggage wagons with pitchfork or scythe, killed many French soldiers, and took many
prisoners. She w& by n.o means an exception.
r
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Napoleon and his Guards marched in the vanguard of the
retreating army. On November 8 he entered Srnolensk and
was followed by sections of the various units of the army. By
the 15th the whole arpy had arrived. During this dreadful
march from Maloyaroslavets Napoleon and his generals had
placed all their hopes on Smolensk. Here, they expected to
find stocks of food-and a fairly quiet haven where the weary
and starving men and.horses would obtain some rest and recuperate from the terrible sufferings they had endured during
she retreat. But it turned out otherwise. In this lifeless, demolished and smoldering city the retreati~lgarmy received
a blow that utterly broke the spirit of many of its units.
Hardly Ay food was found.
From that moment the retreat became a flight, and all
that the Grand Army had suffered on the road from
Maloyaroslavets paled into insignificance compared with the
abyss that now opened up before it and swallowed it almost
entirely.
The last days of this bloody struggle were approaching.
The death throes of Napoleon's army lasted from November
17, when it had started out from Smolensk, to the evening
of December 14, when its rear guard, consisting of several
hundred able-bodied men under Marshal Ney, together with
several thousands of unarmed, wounded and sick men, crossed
the Niemen and reached the Prussian side.
On November 14, after a stay of five days, Napoleon wiih
his Guards marched out of Smolensk in the direction of
Krasnoye. He was followed by the remnants of the army corps
commanded by Viceroy Eughne, Davout and Murat. Behind
them marched the rear gu&d, commanded by Marshal Ney.
Following on Ney's heels came the Russian forces. The days
were approaching when Ney was destined by a desperate
struggle and skillful maneuver to save Napoleon and his
110,000 to 45,000 men, and the 30,ooo sick, unarmed, weary and
disab1.d men who had plodded behind the army from Smolensk through Krasnoye to Dubrovno and Orsha.
On November 20 Napoleon left Orsha Three days later the
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advance patrols of his vanguard saw before them a long strip
.of murky water. This was a fairly wide river with very muddy
banks, - not yet,frozen, but here and there already covered with
small patches of ice. It was difficult to ford this river even
under Aord~nary.
conditions; how miich more difficult was it
now that it w
'= beginning to freeze. This was the Berezina
River.-Napitsam and his ~Gardswere a.pproa_chinga mortalfy
.dangerouS barrier, which they had-ts..&ver~orne
or else yerish,
'
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THE CROSSING OF THE BEREZINA AND THE

DOOM OF NAPOLEON'S ARMY
N NOVEMBER 16 the city of Minsk, where Napoleon

0

expected to find large stocks of food and munitions, was
. captured by the Russian troops, the vanguard of Chichagov's .
army. Napoleon learned of this two days later, before entering
Orsha. Soon after, he was amazed to hear that Chichagov had
already occupied Borisov. He at once sent orders to his generals to concentrate as many troops as possible near Borisov in order to cover his retreat across the Borisov Bridge to the
right bank of the Berezina..
On November 25 he succeeded by a series of skillful maneuvers and demonstrations to direct Chichagov's attention on
Borisov and south of it, and while the latter was concentrating his forces there Muiat, Oudinot and two generals of
the Corps of Engineers built two bridges across the Studianka,
a tributary of the Berezina.
On the night of November 25 the Imperial Guard arrived
at the Studianka. At dawn next day Napoleon arrived. He
gave the order to cross the river at once. At that moment
he had at his command only 19,000 men. The crossing was
l
who was the first
started under the fire of ~ e n e r a Chaplits,
, to learn that Napoleon was diverting his troops from Borisov.
Napoleon ordered that the bridgeheads on both banks of the
river be strongly guarded. All day long troops continued to
arrive. At night he ordered Marshal Ney with the remnants
of his corps and the Young Guard to cross to the right bank
and, battalion following battalion, the crossing continued all
night and during the whole morning of the gth. At about
P P.M. on the 27th Napoleon with the Old Guard crossed the
; river, followed 6 y other divisions.
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The French army lined up on the right bank of the river,
and when the last of the forces had crossed Napoleon ordered
the bridges to be blown up.
And now the world was to witness the final death agony
of this great horde. Napoleon had no time to arrange for the
crossing of the wounded and sick and the foreign civilians
who followed his army from Moscow; they were all left to
their fate. An eye witness has described the scene that ensued as follows:
'

"On the evening of that day when Napoleon crossed the
Berezina, the Veselovski plain, which is yather wide, presented
:
a horribleaand indescribable picture. It owas covered with carriages and carts-most of them broken and piled up one on top
: of the other-and strewn with the bodies of dying women and
children who had followed the a r m y from Moscow either to
f- escape the horrors of that city or to accornpatiy their fellow
i: countrymen.
.
"The fate. of thesg u~?fortunate,
people caught between two
fighting armies was awful. Many of them were,trampled under
the horses' hoofs, others were crushed by t h e heavy wagons,
while many were mowed down by the 'bail of shot and shell, or
drowned in the river in trying to ford it with the troop. At .
ihe most moderate estimate, ten thousand people must have
b,F perished. . ."
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Bur \besi'de this glbo&y
we have another provided
bi ' h e dminhicen=ei of &her eperwh&es, which reyeais the
f ma.indnibiiy and hum;iniiy displayed'by the Rp& soldiers:
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fifty Frenchmen squatting in a circle round each fire without
betraying the si-ightest sign of fear. Our good, kind Karpenko,
who-had dh16ssly cut down the*enemy when' he was face to
face with him, saved the lives of many of these unfortunate
men."
At -thstime .the position of the French army was catas- .&w@xic.
I

"The wind and frost .were cruel; all the roads -we= snowed
under. Crowds of Frenchmen were staggering in a field near by.
Some of them managed to light a fire and sat around it. Others
cut slices of flesh from the dead horses and ate it, some roasted
and some even raw. Saon 1 carne across people who were freezing, or already frozen to death. . . ."

By this time hunger among the troops had reached its highest pitch. On November 28 a severe frost set in, which reached
3 1 below zero (F) and lasted until December 12.
The historian Skgur, who was with the French army at that
time, asserts that about 60,000 men crossed the Berezina with
Napoleon and that anqther 20,000 from the army corps on
- the flanks joined them. Of these 8o,ooo, however, 40,000
perished on the way from the Berezina to Vilna. And many
more were destined to perish on the way from Vilna to the
Niemen.
On December g the first groups of half-frozen and starving
men entered Vilna. They immediately ransacked the stores
so that they could eat and clothe themselves before they were
driven off by the Russians. Next day the first Russian units
began to approach Vilna. The French troops retired to the
Niemen at Kwno.
Napdeon had left the army at Smorgonia on December 6,
appointing Murat, King of Naples, commander-in-chief of its
remnants. At that moment Napoleon regarded the Russian
campaign merely as a lost round in a game, and his mind
wakalready absorbed with plans for another w h a he hoped
he would play better than he had this one. H e was not yet
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aware that the wound inflicted upon him by the Russian
people was mortal, and would put an end to his world empire.

The Russian campaign drew to a close. In the latter half of
December the survivors of Macdonald's units, and small
crowds of weary men who had lost their way in the forests of
Lithuania, continued to cross into Prussia. On the whole,
less than 30,ooo men remained under the command of Murat
and, after his departure, under the command of the Viceroy
of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais. And this was all that remained of the Grand Army-of the 420,000 men who, on June
24, 18I 2, crossed the Niemen on four bridges, and the 150,000
'men who subsequently joined this army.

T H E REASON FOR T H E COLLAPSE OF NAPOLEON'S POWER I N EUROPE
EVERAL generations of thinkers have been uninterruptedly engaged in probing the causes of Napoleon's final catastrophe, the climax of which was reached with amazing rapidity. In the first months of 1812 Napoleon had reached the
pinnacle of power. ~e was the autocratic ruler-either directlyor through his viceroys, governor-generals, or absolutely obedient vassals--over a territory commencing from the Niemen and
induding Danzig, Hamburg and Amsterdam, right' up to
Madrid, Calabria and Illyria.
His mere word was enough to dethrone any king ox to wipe
off the map any state on the continent of Europe. He could
quarter troops wherever he desired and keep them there as
long as he pleased. There were only two powers in Europe
who were independent of him-England in the extreme'west,
and Russia in the extreme East. But Napoleon was confident
that, having conquered the continent, he would be able to
subdue these countries too. .
In the spring of 1811 Napoleon received in his palace in
the Tuileries the Bavarian General von Brede. In the course of
conversation this general diffidently and respectfully expressed
the opinion that it .would be unwise to pick a quarrel with
Russia and attack her. Napoleon with a peremptory gesture
interrupted the general and said in-a sharp and emphatic tone:
"Within three years from now I shall be ruler of the world!"
But within three years the greatest empire that had existed
since the time of Alexander the Great was a heap of.ruins. . . .
In the opinion of military experts, in these East years-years
of frightful, sanguinary struggle-Napoleon often displayed
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the-same supreme perfection in the art of war that he had
shown in his numerous earlier &mpaigns. This was the case,
for example, in a8 13-14. The forces at his command a t the
beginning of \this final struggle were far larger than he had
commandeil on any previous occasion. Consequently, the collapse of this colossus must have been due to far deeper cause$
than the loss of a particular battle, or even of a whole
campaign.
In -the'course of Napoleon's career an extremely important
change occurred-symptoms of which were visible long before
his d6bAcle-which made that catastrophe inevitable. Unless
this factor is understood, every attempt to explain the collapse
of Napoleon's Empire will amount to no more than the repetition of the innimerable mystical, romantic iiid idealistic fantasies with which the history of his reign is already so replete.
Napoleon was indomitable and every:attempt to resist him
ended with 'the defeat of his adversary. But this was true as
long & he & ~ e d
as tlie "surgedn of 'history"-accelerating the
Wi
@ operatibn of'~historically
progressive pririciples and destroying
by fire and sword the obsolete 'and 'doomed feudal system in
EUT~. I t was &is period when ~ a ~ o l e ,was
o n crushing and
s ~ e e ~ i n ' ~ ' , a wthe
a y feudal-aristoq.atic and 'absolutist manarchi&'of Eiuope that Marx and Engels had in mind when
they A d that. in a certain sense the Napoleonic Wars.did for
the continent oE Europe what the guillotine. had done in
France during the Reign of
European feudal absolutism could never recover from the fnihtful b1ovs that Napo%..L.. icon dealt it; 'and i n the countries that he had knquered the
sympathies-of all prdgressive people-sometimes concealed and
sometimes unambigu.ously expressed-were undoubtedly on
the side of the conqueror.
:
symptoms of these changes had been visible for a long time.
After Austerlitz its banefui effects were felt in the Germanic
countries, in Belgium, Holland and ltaiy; and they were
: seen even by those who in 1804 saw nothing prejudicial in
,Napoleon assuming the title of Emperor, and who believed
that the role of liberator of nations could be played even by

"

error.

1

57

'

- one who wore the royal purple. But after the Peace Bf Tihit
-

all illusions on this s-mehad to-be 2 5 d d .
Napoleon 'began openly to advan'ce the principle &at he
had been applying for a considerable time past. The fatal
flaw in this
was that it drew a distinction between
France, or the "old departments," as it was called, and the
e,
was called the "new derest of conquered ~ u r o ~ which
partments." According to this principle the French were the
privileged, ruling race, and they alone were to enjoy to the
full all the benefits and privileges gained by the victorious
sword of the Emperor. The other nations of Europe were destined to be the vassals of France.
Although designating himself "Emperor of the West" and
aspiring to become the ruler of the world, Napoleon nevertheless deliberately played the part of a French national sovereign, daiming the right to rob all his other subjects in the
interests of the French. "For'me the interests of the nation
are supreme," he said, meaning by that the interests of the
French bourgeoisie, for whom Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland,
Belgium, the Germanic couniries, the Duchy of Poland, etc.,
were to serve primarily as markets and sources of raw materials. He deliberately ruined the countries which were likely
to become competitors of France; and he openly stated that
the French deserved special protection not only because they
were the most "loyal" of his innumerable subjects, but also
because they were a superior race.
He expressed these opinions with his characteristic bluntness and candor because he was absolutely convinced of the
idallability of his fundamental principles. For example, in
estimating his losses in battle, he considered that the only
casualties worth considering were those suffered by the French
units of his multi-national armies. This is what he said about
the Grand Army that perished in the snows in Russia: "In
Russia our losses were extremely heavy, but not as heavy as
many suppose. The Imperial
had-barely 140,000 ~ r e i c h speaking men, and the campaign of 1812 cost old France
0
proper only 50,000 men." '
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H e emphasized the same point in his famous conversation
with Prince Metternich in Dresden on June 28, 1813, when
he refused to conclude peace with the Allies. He admitted in
that conversation that among those who perished in 1812
-"were loo,ooo of the finest soldiers of France." "These I am
really sorry for," he said: "As for the rest, they were only
Italians, Poles and, above all, Germans!" And he pronounced
the word "Germans" with a contemptuous grimace.
"Granted," answered Metternich, "but Your Majesty will
agree that this is not the argument to use when speaking to a
German."
Napoleon oppressed economically and ruined the European
nations he had conquered not only by means of his continental
blockade, but by other stern measures which he imposed upon
them in the economic field to prevent them from developing
their independent economic life. For example, he prohibited
the introduction of modern technical improvements in the
conquered countries; he ordered that all stocks of raw silk be
exported from Italy for the use of the silk weavers of Lyons,
leaving for the Italian silk weavers only what surplus the
French did riot need. He deliberately prohibited the building
of roads essential for commerce, and ordered that thousands
of Merino sheep be 'driven from Spain into France, thus depriving the Spanish cloth weavers of fine wool. In the
"ideological" sphere, so to speak, he did not hesitate to assert
at every opportunity that it 'was the birthright of the French
to rule over the rest of mankind.
After the Peace of Tilsit, when the border-line between
the permissible and impermissible rapidly began to lose all
significance for him, Napoleon no longer confronted the peoples of Europe-and the progressive class that the bourgeoisie
represented at' that time-as a liberator, but as a cruel tyrant
who divided mankind into lords and slaves, placing in the
first category the French alone and condemning the rest of
mankind to the second. He began to be regarded as a ruthless despot who deliberately ruined the countries unfortunate
enough to come under his heel; and it became the dream of
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the whole of progressive mankind to rid the world of this
tyrant*
The desvuction of the Grand Army was intimately connected with the change that took place in Napoleon's historic
activities, and is therefore a matter of supreme interest from
the point of view of the subject we are discussing. In the first
years of Napoleon's reign his army was invincible. But to
the extent that it absorbed elements that were alien to the
French its spirit changed; its monolithic compactness and
unit$ which had made it such a powerful instrument in the
hands of its leader, relaxed. Thus, Napoleon's army began to
lose its invincibility long before 181n.
But in that year, reckless of the consequences, he drove
into Russia not only soldiers from the multi-racial populations of subjugated Europe but also spaniardsnfrom the
Pyrenees peninsula, which he had invaded. The Spanish people had by no means been subjugated and continued to offer
fierce and uninterrupted resistance to the conqueror. T o fight
on behalf of an alien cause, on behalf of a tyrant who was
oppressing and ruining one's native land, and knowing that
every new victory he achieved only served to rivet the chains
of slavery still more firmly on his victims, was more than
human nature could stand. ,
This had a fatal effect upon Napoleon's army, and the signs
of its1disintegration were visible to all who had eyes to see.
Striking evidence of this was seen during the battle of Leipzig, when, at the height of the battle, the Saxons, who had
been forcibly driven into the fight, went over to the side of
Napoleon's enemies, turned their guns on the French and
shot them down at short range.
Thus, the invincibility of Napoleon's army disappeared
when he abandoned the historically progressive mission that
he had been fulfilling, when the halo of warrior against feudal
reaction had faded from his brow, and when he began to use
the unlimited power he had acquired in the pursuit not only
of reactionary but utterly impossible aims-to transform the
French into a ruling nation and all other nations into dumb
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beasts of burden. This utter contempt for the material interests and. human dignity of the conquered nations, this separation of the peoples into sheep and goats, into a race of
lords and a race of slaves, served to disintegrate the army just
as it disintegrated the foundations of the great political edifice that Napoleon had erected.
One of the numerous factors that caused Napoleon to undertake the invasion of Russia was the dimming of his formerly brilliant political mind. This had become evident from
the moment he came under the spell of the illusion that
France was destined to rule all the nations of the globe and
that it was his "mission" to organize and lead this ruling
French race. What is Russia? A country, like all other countries, destined to be subjugated. If she dares to claim the
right to pursue an independent policy, it only shows that "she
is challenging fate." This was the idea that he had expressed
on more than one occasion even before he expounded it i ~ t
his proclamation announcing his invasion of Russia.
Napoleon put before the nations of Europe the alternative of either abandoning all thought of Europe ever being
into a life-and,free from alien conquerors, or of
death struggle to overthrow the despot, and to prove that all
the talk about the mission of the French race to rule the world
was merely political delirium. Europe toqk the latter course,
and it fell to the lot of the Russian people to bear the brunt
of this great struggle. It was Russia that first dispelled themyth, so leng prevailing, that Napoleon's army was invincible.
'

On June 24, 1812, Napoleon, the greatest soldier the world
had ever seen, crossed into Russian territory, and this, as
Talleyrand expressed it, marked "the beginning of the end"
of his rule in Europe.
On June 22, igqi, the miserable adventurer Hitler, dreaming of becoming a Napoleon, hurled his armies across'the frontiers of the Soviet Union. But this perfidious and malicious
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enemy miscalculated his own strength and the strength of
the Soviet people. Accustomed to easy victories over 'unarmedA
nations, or over armies that had been betrayed by their governments and generals, and knowing no other victories, he
thought he would have a walkover in the knavish adventure
he had undertaken. But at the first impact with the might
of the Red -4nny.he learned that at last he had met his
master. .
The starvation in his country is even greater than the most
barren parts of Napoleon's vast empire ever experienced. In
the army, which still obeys him-in fear of death-in every regiment and every company of even the most nationally "pure"
army corps and division, class hatred and strife reign to a
degree that Napoleon's Grand Army never knew.
The case of Napoleon proves t d us that even the greatest
military leader is powerless and doomed when he sets out to
achieve the absolutely impossible aim-inspired exclusively
by krude political egoism-of becoming the ruler of the world
and of ruthlessly exploiting his own and subjugate&peoples.
Today it has a-gain fallen to the lot of the great Russian
people to liberate ;Europe, this time from a far more cruel,
despicable and shameful yoke than she had borne before.
As Joseph Stalin said in his famous broadcast of July g,
1941, on the scorched earth:
\

"This war. with fascist Germany cannot be considered an
ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is
a130 a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German
fascist armies.
"The aim of this national war in defense of our country
against .the fascist oppressors is not only elimination of the
danger hanging over. our country, but also to aid all the
European peoples groaning under the yoke of Germa~fascism.
"In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In.this
great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe
and America, including the German people, who are enslaved
by the Hitlerite despots.
"Our war for the freedom of our country will merge with
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the samggh o
f the peoples af Europe and America for their
independence, for d ~ o ~ tlibemes.
i c
"It will be a united front of the peoples standing for freedom and against enslavement
. .
and threats of enslavement by
Hitler's fascist armies." *

.
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r mankind the beginning of the end is already
e Russian people.today are displaying the same
a101 courage and self-sacrifice in the moment of danger as they
displayed at the time when Napoleon was forced to admit that
the Russian soldiers were braver than any he had had to contend against before. But how much other conditions have
the technical equipment of the armed forces of the
is in no way inferior to that of the invading
enemy, and in many respects is far superior. Basing itself on
the experience of all the great wars and battles in history, inin the present European war, the Red Army
crushing blows on the arrogant foe. The myth
army is "invincible" has been dispelled. As Stalin
said in the broadcast:
:

'

"History shows that there are no invincible armies and never
have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible but it
was beaten successively by Russian, English and German.
armies." As for ~itler'fiGerman fascist army, "this army had
not yet met with serious resistance on the continent of ~ u r o ~ e .
Only on our territory has it met serious resistance. And if, as
a result of this resistance, the finest divisions of Hitler's German fascist army have been defeated by our Red Army, it
means that this army too can be smashed and will be smashed
as were the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm. . . . The men of
the Red Army are displaying unexampled valor. Our resistance to the enemy is growing in strength and power.
"Side by side with the Red Army, the entire Soviet people
are rising indefense of our native land."**

The despicable criminals, who, as the renowned German
author Heinrich Mann has said, have exceeded all bounds of
human baseness, will not succeed in enslaving the eoo,ooo,ooo
free citizens of the Soviet Union. As ~ o l o t o said
i
on behalf
of the Soviet people: "Ours is a just cause. The enemy willbe
mshed. Victory will be. ours!"
,. -

